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The parties to this pioceedmg ate Defendant and \ppellant \DV-\NCLD 
MAWOEMLNT CONCEPTS, l\C ( VMC '), and Plamtitt and Vppellee SI \f FING 
AMLRIC \ , INC ( k S \ r V Defendant Raynette L Corugan vva^  a party below, but the trial 
court dismissed all claims against Ms Coirigan and concluded AMC wab \ itanously liable 
for all of her conduct Neither the Appellant nor the Appellee ha\ e challenged that ruling 
on this appeal 
Pacific Life & Annuity Company (fka PM Group Lite Insurance Company 
and/or Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company) was also named as a Defendant during pre-
trial proceedings, but was never served and did not appear before the trial court It wab 
dismissed on Plaintiffs own motion before trial 
Pursuant to Rule 3(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which directs that 
"[t]he title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal," 
Appellee SAI designates the parties as identified m the Distnct Court, as opposed to the new 
designation Appellant presents in its Bnef 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to L'tah 
Code § 78-2a-3( 2 )(j). 1 he Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to (Jtah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and its Order dated June 23, 2004. (See R. 606.) 
ISSUES 
L Did the District Court properly admit evidence of lost profits in support of SALs 
claims? 
Standard of Review: 
Whether the District Court properly admitted evidence of lost profits damages 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT 
App 31, ^[6, 973 P.2d 445 ("We review the trial court's decision to award damages under a 
standard which gives the court considerable discretion, and will not disturb its ruling absent 
an abuse of discretion/') 
AMC fails to provide a "citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court," as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). 
IL Did SAI prove its damages with reasonable certainty? 
Standard of Review: 
The District Court's decision to award damages is reviewed under a standard 
which gives the court considerable discretion, and its ruling is not disturbed absent an abuse 
of discretion. See, e.g., Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App 3 i ,f6,973 P.2d 445. The District 
Court's finding as to the amount of damages is a factual question and is not reversed unless 
1 
clearly erroneous. Shar's Cars, LLC, etal. v. Elder, etal., 2004 UT App 258, «,j I U 9 7 P-3d 
724; LysenkiK 1999 UT App 3 1, «| 6. 
III. Did the District Court correctly award attorney fees based on AiNFC's breach of 
fiduciary duty? 
Standard of Review: 
The District Court's determination that a fiduciary duty existed in this case 
should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. This Court has held thattfcC while 
we generally consider de novo a trial court's statement of the legal rule, we often review with 
far less rigor the court's determination of the legal consequences of facts.'" C&Y Corp., 
et al. \\ General Biometrics, Inc., et al, 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (reviewing 
finding of no breach of fiduciary duty) {quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 
1994)). The Utah Supreme Court has also held: "'Whether or not a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.'" First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., et al. v. Banberry Development Corp., et al., 786 P.2d 1326, 
1332 (Utah 1990) {quoting Dennison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235, 
1241 (1982)). The finding of a breach of fiduciary duty is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. C&Y Corp., 896 P.2d at 54 ("the standard of review in this case is closer 
to broad discretion than to de novo"). 
Whether the district court correctly awarded attorney fees based on AMC's 
breach of fiduciary is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Campbell v. State 
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, %\ 19, 65 P.3d 1134 ("Whether attorney fees should be 
2 
awarded in a particulai case is a question of law reviewed for correctness") (cuing 
Valcarcc v Fitzgerald^ 961 P.2d 305, 315 (I tah 1998)), Ilowe\et, the District Court has 
broad discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee, and that determination is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Valcarce, 951 P.2d at 3 15. 
Appellant AMC may have preserved the issue of whether the District Court 
correctly awarded attorney fees in its post-trial filings, specifically its "Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys" Fees" (R. 503-508), but it failed 
to provide a "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court,1' 
as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). Furthermore, AMC failed to presence the issue 
of whether AMC breached its fiduciary duty to SAt, and in fact explicitly waived it. 
IV. Did the District Court properly order Garnishee Redland Insurance Company 
to place its policy proceeds in the care and custody of the court? 
Standard of Review: 
No Utah case articulates the standard of review for determining whether a 
district court properly ordered insurance proceeds to be placed in an escrow account in the 
care and custody of the court. Given the circumstances surrounding garnishment 
proceedings, this issue should be reviewed in general for correctness, while at the same time 
granting a certain measure of deference to the District Court which is in the better position 
to evaluate the dynamics of a garnishment proceeding than an appellate court. See WJtitney v. 
Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, f 8, 95 P.3d 270 (reviewing decision of trial court regarding interest 
against garnishees under an abuse of discretion standard); Rappleye v. Rappleye, 2004 UT 
App 290, ^15. 99 P.3d 34S (e\ aluating jurisdiction of district court to garnish proceeds from 
a sale of property for correctness);,/. Pochvnok Company, Inc. v. SmedsriuL 2003 UT App 
375, V>, 80 P.3d 563 (holding that "trial court did not clearly err in finding the funds were 
subject to garnishment"); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-940 (Utah 1994) (explaining the 
spectrum of standards of review, the deference granted to district courts on issues involving 
mixed questions of law and fact, and noting examples where discretion is granted to district 
courts for policy reasons such as when aspects of the case can be observed by a district court 
and not reflected in the record available to appellate courts). 
AMC did not preserve this issue for appeal and failed to provide a "citation to 
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court,'1 as required by Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal. However, if the Court addresses the merits of Appellant's issue no. 4, the 
interpretation of the current and previous versions of Utah R. Civ. P. 64D may have a beanng 
on the Court's determination. 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by one Professional 
Employer Organization ("PCO") toward another. AMC and SAl each were in business as 
PEOs. They became co-emplo>ers of SAFs client employees when they entered into a PEO 
arrangement by which AMC \\ ould acquire and maintain a health insurance benefit program 
for the co-employees. Their arrangement was a principal-agent relationship. AMC agreed 
to act on behalf of SAI to help SAI acquire and maintain health insurance for the co-
employees. Although SAI collected premium monies from the co-employees and regularly 
forwarded them to AMC for health insurance premiums, AMC failed to use those monies to 
maintain health insurance for the co-employees. 
As a result, health insurance coverage lapsed causing damages to SAI and the 
co-employees. Following a bench trial, the District Court concluded AMC was negligent and 
breached fiduciary duties owed to SAI. The Court awarded damages, attorney fees, and 
litigation expenses totaling $ 1,000,309.22. The District Court's Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Amended Judgment, and Findings and Order Awarding Attorney 
Fees and Litigation Expenses entered May 28, 2004 (see R. 545-574), are included in the 
Addendum. AMC appeals the District Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
L SAI filed its initial complaint on December 10, 1998, alleging breach 
of fiduciary duty and other claims. (R. 001-008.) Through subsequent amendments, SAFs 
5 
theories of liability against AMC wete nairowed and refined. (Sec R. 119-132, 169-189, 
349-358, and 368-371.) Ultimately SAf alleged two causes of action against AMC: (1) 
negligence, and (2) breach of fiduciary dut>. (,V^ R. 349-358.) 
2. AMC was represented by Mr. Donald J. Purser, Esq., who filed an 
answer on its behalf (R. 411-415.) 
3. A bench trial was held in the District Court on March 17 and 19, 2004. 
(R. 735-736.) Mr. Purser continued to represent AMC at the bench trial. (R. 735: 2, 5.) 
4. At trial, SAI introduced evidence through a number of witnesses 
including Dan Roberts and Sheila Roberts, both employees of SAI; Jane Haugsoen, an 
individual who received employment benefits through SAI; EJ. k'Jack" Phelps (by 
deposition) who was an insurance broker for AMC; Alan W. Mortensen, Esq., who testified 
as an expert witness regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees sought by SAI; and Paul N. 
Shields, CPA, an expert witness who testified regarding the damages suffered by SAI due 
to AMC's acts and omissions. (R. 735-736.) 
5. AMC called no witnesses and offered no evidence at trial, except 
Exhibit 61. (See id.) 
6. In this appeal AMC challenges the award of damages, including lost 
profits. (Aplt. Br. at 11-32.) The evidence at trial regarding lost profits included the 
testimony of Paul Shields, a professional accountant and business valuation and economic 
loss analyst (R. 736 at 274:19 to 345:9), and the testimony of SAI employees Dan Roberts 
and Sheila Roberts. 
6 
7 Dan Roberta testified about o\erpa> men ts ot piuruum monies to WIC 
tor health uisutance coverage, which \\K allowed to lapse(R 24 7 to 2b 7) and regaidmg 
business and clients that weie lost due to WIC s lailme to maintain the msuiante (R 7^o 
at 77 14 to 79 13) Sheila Roberta also testified legarding lost profits (R 735 at 118 12 to 
119 22), and out-of-pocket expenses S \ l paid to or on behalf ot the co employees (R 735 
at 120 21 to 221 25 ) 
8 Mr Shields testified regarding all three components of damage to S AI 
losses incurred due to payment of claims that should have been covered by health insurance, 
overpayment of insurance premiums for non-existent coverage, and lost profits of SAl (See 
R 736at283 15 to 331 25) Mr Shields'testimony and report were adopted by the District 
Court in its award of damages to SAl (See R 736 at 395 25 to 397, court adopting "whole 
cloth the findings of Mr Shields as contained in [Exhibit] 55 ") 
9 Following the bench trial, the Distnct Court made very specific findings 
of fact, none of which are challenged by AMC on this appeal The pertinent findings of fact 
are outlined below 
10 SAl has been licensed as a PEO under Utah Code Ann § 58-59-102 
since 1995 (R 550 ) As a PEO, SAl is in the business of acquiring or providing 
employment benefits for the employees of its small business clients, such as health insurance, 
life insurance, workers compensation benefits, payroll services, etc (R 551 ) Through a 
PEO arrangement with its clients, SAl agreed to provide the employees with health insurance 
benefits (R 551 ) 
7 
1 1 Health insutance is a common emplovment benefit in the State of L tah 
and elsewhere ft is common and reasonable foi empio\ees to rel> upon their emplovei to 
acqune and maintain that coverage as a means of piov idmg necessar> medical treatment foi 
their families (R 532-^53 ) 
12 In May 1996, SAI and AMC entered into a further PEO arrangement by 
which SAI and AMC became co-employers of the employees otSAI's clients (R 551,535 ) 
Before the parties entered into the PTO airangement, AMC provided a biochure to SAi 
which stated as follows 
[Y]ou can think of AMC as a "Business Partner'1 who assists 
you by assuming the employee liability that affects the corporate 
"bottom line" on a daily basis As the Client, you contract with 
AMC to transfer all oi part of your existing payroll and 
personnel to AMC AMC then becomes the "Legal Employer," 
assuming total employee liability and responsibility foi all 
human resource/employee management functions 
(R 551 ) SAI and AMC then entered into the PEO arrangement, and AMC agreed to act on 
behalf of SAI to obtain health insurance coverage for the co-employees (R 552 ) 
13. During the course of their PEO arrangement, AMC communicated vv ith 
SAI about health insurance benefits and looked to SAI as the legal representative of the co-
employees (R 553 ) Each month SAI provided AMC with the names of each co-employee 
for whom AMC was to obtain or maintain health insurance SAI paid health insurance 
premiums to AMC on behalf of the co-employees (R 552-553 ) 
14. When AMC received communications from health insurers, it forwarded 
them to SAI for dissemination to the co-employees The communications sent to SAI 
8 
included providing health insurance benefit pamphlets, which SAl then distributed to the 
co-employees. (R. 553.) 
15. AMC failed to obtain initial health insurance coverage for the co-
employees until August 1996, when it then secured coverage through Jefferson Pilot Life 
Insurance Company. AMC made only one premium payment to Jefferson Pilot on behalf the 
co-employees, for the month of August 1996, and failed to make any other premium 
payments. (R. 555.) 
16. SAI later discovered that AMC permitted the health insurance coverage 
to lapse when some of the co-employees submitted medical claims that were rejected. Those 
co-employees then contacted SAl, not AMC, and SAI in turn communicated with AMC. 
(R. 554-556.) 
17. AMC never told SAI that premium payments were not being made. 
AMC claimed the cancellation of coverage was due to an error by AMC's agent of record, 
Foy & Associates. (R. 554-556.) 
18. AMC then tried to find replacement coverage for the co-employees, and 
in June 1997 obtained coverage through Pacific Life & Annuity (aka the PM Group). 
AMCs new agent of record, EJ. Phelps & Co., provided to the PM Group a list of all co-
employees to be covered. (R. 556.) 
19. Then, in January 1998, SAI discovered that AMC allowed the PM 
Group coverage to lapse when a co-employee received notice that the PM Group coverage 
had ended October 31, 1997. (R. 557.) 
9 
20 Unbeknownst to S M, the PM Group sent letters to \ M C m Dccembei 
1()97 stating the health mstuance coveiage foi the co-emplovecb was teiminated effective 
October 31, 1997 (R 557, h \ ^ ) I he PM Gioup had previouslv Mmt delinquency letters 
to AMC m October and November 1997, stating that the health insurance coveiage would 
be cancelled unless premium monies vveie paid (R 557, hx 32 ) 
21. AMC failed to notify SAf that it had become delinquent in the payment 
of health insurance premiums or that it allowed the health insurance coverage to lapse 
(R 559 ) 
22. Due to AMC's negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, SAI sustained 
losses in seveial categones The Distnct Court adopted 4%whole cloth" the testimony of 
Paul N. Shields and his expert report in awarding damages to SAI (See R. 736 at 395:25 to 
397, adopting "whole cloth . . . the findings of Mr Shields as contained in [Exhibit] 55.") 
AMC offered no competing expert testimony to refute Mr. Shield's conclusions. (R 736 at 
346:24 to 349:3.) In fact, AMC offered no testimony at all during the tnal 
23. Accordingly, the Distnct Court awarded the following damages to SAI: 
(1) $143,233 in medical claims and other costs SAI incurred to or on behalf of the co-
employees that should have been covered by the health insurance benefits program, (2) 
$79,612 in payments to AMC for health insurance premiums for the co-employees, which 
AMC accepted but failed to use to secure health insurance coverage; and (3) $228,999 of lost 
profits. (R. 559-560; Ex. 55.) 
10 
24. The District Court thus awarded SAI the total principal amount of 
damages of S451,844. (R. 560.) I he District Court then awarded SAI pre-judgment interest 
in the amount of 5269,016.77. (R. 565.) According!), the damages and pre-judgment 
interest totaled $720,860.77. (R. 547.) 
25. The District Court also awarded SAI attorney fees and litigation 
expenses incurred in prosecuting the action against AMC. (R. 568-73.) The Court found, 
based upon the expert testimony of Mr. Mortensen, that a contingent fee arrangement in this 
type of case was reasonable and appropriate, that it was reasonably foreseeable to AMC that 
SAI would incur attorney fees as a result of the cancellation of health insurance coverage, 
and that SAI would bring legal action under a contingent fee arrangement. (R. 572.) The 
District Court also found that the litigation expenses incurred by SAI's legal counsel were 
reasonable. (R. 572.) 
26. The District Court awarded SAI attorney fees of $240,286.92 and 
litigation expenses of $39,161.53. (R. 572.) The total amount of attorney fees and litigation 
expenses awarded is $279,448.45. (R. 572.) 
27. In total, the District Court entered judgment against AMC in the amount 
of $1,000,309.22. (See R. 547, 572.) 
28. On June 22, 2004, Plaintiff SAI served a Writ of Garnishment upon 
AMC's liability insurer, Redland Insurance Company ("Redland"), demanding the proceeds 
of the Redland Policy to satisfy the judgment. (See R. 621.) Redland objected and moved 
to quash or stay the writ of garnishment. (R. 629-643.) 
11 
20. The District Court held a hearing on Redland\s motion on October 25, 
2004. (R. 732-734.) Following the hearing, on December 14, 2004, the District Court issued 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (the "Garnishee Order"). (See 
Addendum.) 
30. By the Garnishee Order, the District Court concluded that the Writ of 
Garnishment was a proper vehicle to levy upon the proceeds of the Redland Policy as an 
asset of AMC. It concluded the Writ of Garnishment was properly issued and that the 
proceeds of the Redland Policy are property subject to garnishment pursuant to 
Rule64D(h)(iii). (See Addendum.) 
31. The District Court then ordered Redland to place the proceeds of the 
Redland Policy into an escrow account where the proceeds would be held in custodia legis, 
pending the outcome of a coverage dispute in Federal District Court. (See Addendum.) 
Specifically, the District Court ordered Redland to "pay the proceeds of the Redland Policy 
in the amount of $1,000,000.00 into a separate interest bearing account to be jointly 
designated by SAI and Redland, pending the outcome of the Federal Court Action." (See 
Addendum.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
SAI proved all its damages including lost profits with reasonable certainty as 
required by Utah law. Its evidence established the fact, the cause, and the amount of lost 
profits with reasonable certainty and enabled the District Court to make a reasonable 
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approximation of damage^ 1 he Dibttict Court piopeiK admitted S \ l \ evidence ot 
damages, including ev idencc of lost profits, and acted well w ithm ib discretion in doing so 
AMC elected not to otter an) e\ idence of its o\\ n to counter S VTs e\ idence ot damages 
AMC raises an issue challenging the adequacy of evidence supporting the 
damages award, but fails to offer any argument on the issue and dumps the buiden of 
argument and research upon this Court. AMC also fails to marshal the evidence to challenge 
the District Court's finding of damages, and foi those reasons the Court should disiegard 
AMC's appeal on this point Nevertheless, the District Court's findings of damages in favor 
of SAI were adequately supported by evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous 
The District Court correctly found that AMC owed a fiduciary duty to SAI to 
acquire and maintain health insurance coverage, based upon principals of agency and other 
general principals of Utah law supporting the imposition of fiduciary duties In the District 
Court, AMC waived its defense to the claim of breach of fiduciary duty. 
The Distnct Court properly awarded attorney fees and litigation expenses to 
SAI based upon AMC's breach of fiduciary duty Utah law supports the award of both 
attorney fees and litigation expenses in this case because the breach of a fiduciary obligation 
is a well-established exception to the American rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases 
generally. The court acted well within its discretion in determining both the amount of 
attorney fees based upon SAFs contingent fee arrangement and the amount of litigation 
expenses awarded. 
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AMC lacks standing to challenge the Garnishee Oidei in this Court It has no 
actual, pcisonal stake m the controversy Redland has a gicatct mteiest m the outcome of 
the issue and has challenged the Garnishee Older m a separate appeal Nevertheless, the 
Distuct Court properly ordered Redland to place the policy pioceeds /// custodia legis, in an 
account undei the cate and custody of the Court, pending the outcome of a coverage action 
in Federal District Court 
Finally, SAI also is entitled to an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses 
incuned on this appeal Because SAI prevailed below, and attorney fees and litigation 
expenses were awarded, SAI is also entitled to an award of attorney fees and litigation 
expenses reasonably incurred on this appeal, if it prevails before this Court 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED SAPS 
EVIDENCE OF LOST PROFITS. 
A. Standard for Proof of Lost Profits. 
SAI established its lost profits and the othei categories of damages with 
reasonable certainty.2 Utah law holds that "[Ijost ptofits must be established with reasonable 
2AMC may have waived its nght to challenge evidence of lost profits on appeal. Mr. 
Shields' schedule of damages, Exhibit 55, was received into evidence without objection. 
Exhibit 55 sets forth the calculations of lost profits and other categories of damages. Counsel 
for AMC was asked whether he had any objection, considered objecting, but then declined 
to do so. (R. 736:331:18 to 332:1.) 
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certaint)." Cook Assoc, Inc. \\ H'arnkk. ct a!, 664 P.2d 1161, 1 165 (I'tah 1983); sec also 
Kilpatrick, ctai v. Wilew Rem & Fielding, ctal, 2001 UT 107, V 6 , 37 P.3d 1 130; Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracev, et ai, 781 I \2d4l4, 418 (Utah 1989). Damages need not be proven 
with absolute precision. Instead, the reasonable certainty standard is met when there is 
sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to make a reasonable approximation. See Cook 
Assoc, 664 P.2d at 1166. The plaintiff must prove both the fact and the amount of lost 
profits with reasonable certainty. See id. at 1165. 
"Once a defendant has been shown to have caused a loss, he should not be 
allowed to escape liability because the amount of the loss cannot be proved with precision/1 
Id. Accordingly, "the reasonable level of certainty required to establish the amount of a loss 
is generally lower than that required to establish the fact or cause of a loss." Id. at 1166 
(emphasis in original); see also Kilpatrick, 2001 UT 107, ^[76; Shares Cars, L.L.C, etal. v. 
Elder, et ai, 2004 UT App 258, ^27-29,97 P.3d 724 (evidence of damages must rise above 
speculation and provide reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of 
damages); Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, et ai, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (same). 
The certainty requirement is met when there is sufficient evidence to enable 
the trier of fact to make a reasonable approximation. See Cook Assoc, 664 P.2d at 1165; see 
also Kilpatrick, 2001 UT 107, ^}76; see generally 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 703 (2d. ed. 
2004) (evidence of damages must "enable[] the factfinder to make a fair and reasonable 
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approximation of damages").' "One method of measuring [lost piofits damages ] is In expert 
testimons " kilpatricL 2001 U T 107, [^76 (anna; Cook Issoc, 664 P.2d at 1 166), see also 
Lxsenko v Sauaxa, 1990 UT \pp 31, ^fl 1-12, 973 PJd 445 (affirming the tual court's 
determination of damages based on testimony of \aluation expert). 
B. SAFs Evidence of Lost Profits. 
SA1 established the fact, the cause, and the amount of lost profits with 
reasonable certainty, which enabled the District Court to make a reasonable approximation 
of damages. Both the fact and the cause of lost profits was proven through the testimony of 
Dan Roberts and Sheila Roberts. Dan Roberts testified in detail about business and clients 
that were lost because AMC caused the cancellation of health insurance for the co-
employees. (R. 735 at 77:14 to 79:13.) Sheila Roberts also testified about clients that were 
lost due to the cancellation of coverage. (R. 735 at 118:12 to 119:22, 185:15 to 200:4.) 
AMC elected not to offer any evidence to rebut the fact or cause of SAFs damages, and it 
fails to marshal any evidence to challenge those findings on this appeal. 
The amount of lost profits was proven through the testimony of Sheila Roberts 
and the expert testimony of Paul Shields. Ms. Roberts testified about the amount of fees 
^Cook Assoc is one of the leading Utah cases on lost profits damages, although AMC 
does not mention or address it. Instead AMC cites four other cases, which actually support 
SAFs position: Winsess v. M.l Conoco Distributors, Inc., 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1979), Atkin 
Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), 
Sawyers v FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), and Canyon Country? Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), (Aplt. Br. at pp. 12-19.) Three of them were decided 
after Cook Assoc, and each of those relies on it. 
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earned each month from each of the clients lost. She also testified about the average fees 
earned per month on all of SATs clients. (R. 735 at 200:8 to 204:2.) Ms. Roberts calculated 
those profit figures from company records of fees earned per client, a\ eraged over a one year 
time period. {Id.) 
Mr. Shields relied upon the trial testimony of Dan Roberts and Sheila Roberts 
as described above, and other information they provided, for his opinion about the amount 
of lost profits SAI suffered. (R. 736 at 310:12 to 312:10.) Exhibit 55 identifies on 
Schedules 5 and 7 the amount of profits SAI earned each month from the clients lost. (Ex. 
55; R. 735 at 203:24 to 204:9.) The record establishes that Mr. Shields calculated SAEs past 
and future lost profits based upon its historical earnings from all of the clients lost, that he 
determined lost "net profits," that he took conservati ve assumptions in calculating the amount 
of lost profits, and that he applied a high discount rate. (Ex. 55; R. 736 at 310-344.) 
Mr. Shields calculated SAEs lost net profits by deducting from SAEs fees the 
amount of SAEs "avoided costs." (R. 736 at 312:11 to 3 13:22.) Avoided costs are those 
costs that the Plaintiff avoids or does not incur as a result of lost business. (Id.) To calculate 
the amount of avoided costs, Mr. Shields reviewed SAI tax returns for a 6-year period and 
identified the types and amount of costs that would be avoided if SAI lost the fees, or 
revenue, from its clients. (R. 736 at 314:6 to 316:19.) From that information, Mr. Shields 
calculated that SAEs avoided costs, as a percentage of SAI revenue, equal 49.2%. (Id.; 
Ex. 55, Schedule 4.) To reach a net profit calculation, therefore, Mr. Shields applied a 49.2% 
17 
leduction fioin the tees SAI would have earned horn the lost clients (R " >6 at slO 20 to 
317 8 ) 
Both the calculation of past lost profits and the projection of future lost piofits 
weie limited to the rathei short and conseivative period of five O) yeats Mi Shields did so 
based upon Dan and Sheila Roberts1 testimony that SAI letamed a client foi an average of 
5 years, and upon Mr Shields' experience with other businesses which showed ;> years is a 
reasonable time period (R 736 at 317 14 to 318 11 ) The 5 year aveiage is a conseivative 
estimate because, as Ms Roberts testified, it includes the clients lost in this instance w ho may 
have stayed vv ith SAI longer but for the cancellation of health insurance cov erage (R 735 
at 205 12 to 206 2, R 736 at 317 24 to 318 11 ) 
[n calculating future lost profits, Mr Shields also conserv atively assumed that 
SAI would have gained only two (2) additional clients per year, but for AMC s wrongful 
conduct (R 736 at 318 12 to 322 12), as opposed to SAFs pre-mcident average of five (5) 
or more new accounts per year (R 735 at 206 24 to 208 5 ) 
Finally, Mr Shields' lost profit projections were then discounted to reflect the 
risk associated with SAFs business Discount tates bring future income streams back to a 
present value, the higher the discount rate, the lower the resulting number Mr Shields used 
a discount rate of 25% which reflects a risk associated with SAFs ability to actually generate 
those future income streams (R 736 at 324 14 to 325 13, see Ex 55, Schedules 6 and 8 ) 
The record shows that the Distnct Court was presented with ample evidence 
at tnal to determine the fact, the cause, and the amount of lost profits with reasonable 
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certain t\. The District Court indeed found that SATs damages w ere prov en u ith reasonable 
certaintv, and there was sufficient evidence to enable the District Court to make a reasonable 
approximation of SAfs damages. The District Court accepted the damages evidence 
presented through Mr. Shields' testimony and report. (See R. 736 at 395:25 to 397, adopting 
"whole cloth . . . the findings of Mr. Shields as contained in [Exhibit] 55".) Those findings 
were then properly set forth in the District Court's Amended Findings of Fact. (R. 559-560.) 
See Lysenko, 1999 UT App 3 i,1fl[ 11-12,973 P.2d445 (affirming trial court's determination 
of damages based upon testimony of valuation expert adopted by the court). AMC offered 
no competing expert testimony to refute Mr. Shield's conclusions. 
The District Court properly exercised its discretion to admit the lost profits 
evidence described above. The evidence satisfied Utah law regarding lost profits damages 
in every respect. Accordingly, the Court should conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion, and should affirm the judgment. 
POINT II 
AMC FAILS TO APPROPRIATELY SUPPORT ITS CHALLENGE 
TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE, 
This Court should refuse to consider AMC's argument that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the amount of damages awarded. AMC presents this argument in its 
"Statement of Issues and Standard of Review," but then fails to argue the issue in its brief. 
AMC also fails to marshal the evidence as required by abundant Utah case law. 
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A. \MC Dumped the But den ol -Viguiucnt and Reseat ch on the C outt 
I tah coin ts are not simph a depositors in which the appealing pat t\ ma\ dump 
the buiden of its argument and research See e ? Spencef \ Pleasant I ten C /ft 2003 I «T 
App 379, ^[20-21, 80 P 3d S46 (letusing to consider an issue that was inadequately bneted), 
MacKaw Hanh, 973 P 2d 941, 947-949 and n 9 (Utah 1998) (same) State \ BishopJK 
P 2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (reiterating that an appellate court "is not simply a depository in 
which the appealing party ma> dump the buiden of argument and research ") 
AMC raises an issue challenging the adequacy ol the ev idence supporting the 
District Court's damages award (Aplt Br at 4), but then fails to offer any argument on the 
point Instead, AMC simply dumps the burden of its argument and research upon the Court 
As a result, the Court should letuse to address the issue See MacKay, 973 P 2d at 949 
B. AMC Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence to Challenge Factual Findings 
on Damages. 
Even if the Court chooses to address the issue, it is clear that AMC failed to 
marshal the evidence as necessary to challenge a factual finding AMC asserts that Cfcthe 
evidence shows [SAl] suffered less damages than alleged " ( \pl t Br at 4 ) By this issue 
AMC challenges the sufficiency of the e\ idence, which requires it to marshal the evidence 
To challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting a factual finding, an 
appellant must marshal all the favorable evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the tnal court's findings are so lacking in support that 
they are against the clear weight of the evidence See e g, Bingham Consolidation Co v 
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Orocsbeck. et ai, 2004 UT App 434, «j 14, 105 P.3d 365 (challenger must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the ev idence); Tanner w 
Carter, 2001 UT 18,1fij 17-19, 20 P.3d 332; see also Utah PL App. P. 24(a)(9) (explaining 
that in order to challenging the sufficiency of evidence, an appellant must marshal "all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding"). This Court has often described the burden 
to marshal the evidence in the following terms: 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon 
the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(emphasis in original). 
AMC has failed to satisfy the marshaling requirement. Its challenge to the 
damages award consists of a lengthy survey of cases sprinkled with a few citations to the 
record. It has failed to identify any evidence that supports the challenged findings, much less 
demonstrate a flaw in the District Court's findings. As a result, its challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence should be rejected. 
2i 
C. The District C o u r t s Factual Findings on Damages are Not Clearly 
Erroneous. 
Even if this issue v\ere properly before the Court, the District Court's factual 
findings regarding damages are not clearly erroneous. The I'tail Supreme Court recentK 
held: 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prov ides that [ijn all 
actions tried upon the facts without a jury, . . . [fjindings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the [district] court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses/ 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f72, 99 P.3d 801 {quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a)); see also Promax Development Corp., 943 P.2d at 255 (explaining review of trial 
court's findings of fact in bench trial for clear error). 
The discussion in Point I above demonstrates that the District Court's findings 
regarding the fact, the cause, and the amount of damages were adequately supported by the 
evidence and were not clearly erroneous. SAI established all elements of its damages with 
reasonable certainty as required by Utah law. See Cook Assoc., 664 P.2d at 1165-66; 
Kilpatrick, 2001 UT 107, ^{76. SAI satisfied the standard with sufficient evidence to enable 
the trier of fact to make a reasonable approximation. CookAssocs., 664 P.2d at 1166. "One 
method of measuring [lost profits damages] is by expert testimony." Kilpatrick, 2001 UT 
107, f76 (citing Cook Assocs., 664 P.2d at 1166); see also Lysenko, 1999 UT App 31, 
Yh H-12 (affirming damages based upon testimony of valuation expert that was adopted by 
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the court). According!}, there is nothing clearly erroneous about the District Court's 
determination of damages, and this Court should affirm the judgment below. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES. 
A. AMC Waived its Defense to Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 
ft is clear that SAI alleged breach of fiduciary duty and that the District Court 
entered judgment in its favor on that claim.4 AMCs counsel acknowledged at trial that SAl 
was claiming breach of fiduciary duty. (R. 735 at 9:7-22.) The District Court found AMC 
liable for breach of fiduciary duty. (R. 546, 563-564, 566.) 
AMC now complains that it did not owe fiduciary duties to SAI (Aplt. Br. 
at 21-30), yet it did not contest the issue at trial and essentially conceded liability on SAFs 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. After the close of evidence, the District Court asked if the 
parties wanted to address liability issues in closing argument. The trial transcript records the 
following colloquy between the Court and AMC's counsel: 
THE COURT: . . . Okay. Now, what about liability as to AMC? 
MR. PURSER: Em not going to argue that-
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PURSER: -because that would not be a good faith argument. 
THE COURT: All right. Then liability as to - okay. Anything 
more? 
4SAI alleged breach of fiduciary duty against AMC in its original Complaint and in 
each amendment thereafter. (R. 3, 125-126, 175-176,355-356.) 
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MR. PURSER: No. Cm waiting for you. 
I ilk COl RT: Okay. Liability then as to AMC on both counts 
as to negligence and breach of fiduciarv dut\, is 
granted as to plaintiff in this matter. All right? 
Now, let's turn to damages. 
(R. 736 at 353:14-25.) 
After that exchange, AMC tried to address the issue of fiduciary duty in its 
argument regarding damages, and the record reads as follows: 
MR. PURSBR: Okay? That's my comparative negligence. 
Breach of fiduciary duty, they have not 
established - they've established that there's a 
contractual duty but not that - no testimony put 
AMC in the stance of a fiduciary. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I've already ruled on that issue. I've 
already found liability on both causes of action. 
(R. 736 at 364:3-14.) AMC did not then object or otherwise question the finding of breach 
of fiduciary duty against it. 
An issue is waived and cannot be raised on appeal if the trial court was not 
"offered an opportunity to rule on the issue." Badger i>. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 
847 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). As shown above, AMC waived its right to challenge 
SAFs breach of fiduciary duty claim and essentially conceded liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty. AMC thereby failed to properly bring the issue before the District Court for a ruling. 
Because AMC conceded the issue in the District Court, it cannot be raised on appeal. 
In a post-trial brief regarding the award of attorney's fees, AMC tried to 
address liability for breach of fiduciary duty in the context of damages and attorney's fees. 
(R. 503-08.) In its reply, SAI pointed out that this argument from AMC was "both untimely 
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and without nient because the District C ourt had ahcady decided the issue when VMO 
conceded habiht\ on the breach ot tiduciai\ dut> claim at tnal \rguabh the question ot 
fiduciary dut\ could be icv icwedb) this C ourt simpl\ because the District Court titled on the 
issue See Spears v Wan 2002 UT 24, \\\, 44 P 3d 742 Howe\er, because VMC 
conceded the issue at trial, the District Court was ne\er asked to rule on it and this Court 
need not address it on appeal See Badger, 966 P 2d at 847 
B. AMC Had Hducian Duties to SAL 
It this C ourt decides to review the fiduciary duty issue, the facts and law make 
clear that AMC owed fiduciary duties to SAI A well-established rule ot law holds that 
agents owe fiduciary duties to their principals See REST Alt Mb NT (SECOND) or AGL\C\ § 
13 (1958) ("An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency ") 
The Restatement defines the agency relationship as follows "Agency is the fiduciary 
relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the 
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act " 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENC\ § 1(1) (1958) 
Under Utah law an agent owes fiduciary duties to its principal See e g , 
Freegard v First Natl Bank, 738 P 2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987) (escrow agent owes fiduciary 
duties to its principal) An individual oi entity who procures insurance for anothei is acting 
as an agent Vina v Jefferson Ins Co of New York, 761 P 2d 581 (Utah Ct App 1988) 
(insurance salesman was common law agent acting on behalf of insured "in procunng 
insurance coverage") A real estate broker and his agents also owe fiduciary duties to the 
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property ov\ ner for \\ horn the> act See Kidd v Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 1984) 
(citing Hal Taylor Assoc v C nionamenca, hie , 657 P.2d 743, 748 (1982)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also outlined the general considerations for the 
imposition of fiduciary duties v\ hen one person acts on behalf of another. In First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. w Banbeny Development Corp., et al, 786 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1990), the 
Court stated that "[t]here is no invariable rule which determines the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship." Id. at 1333. The Court then described the nature of the fiduciary relationship 
as follows: 
A fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily for the 
benefit of another. A fiduciary is in a position to have and 
exercise and does have and exercise influence o\er another. A 
fiduciary relationship implies a condition of superiority of one 
of the parties over the other. Generally, in a fiduciary 
relationship, the property, interest or authority of the other is 
placed in the charge of the fiduciary. 
Id, The Utah Supreme Court also has held that 4i[a] fiduciary or confidential relationship may 
be created by contract.. . where equity will imply a higher duty in a relationship because the 
trusting party has been induced to relax the care and vigilance he would ordinarily exercise." 
Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982); see also Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985) (explaining that a 
fiduciary relationship is created because of the trust and reliance placed in an insurer by an 
insured).^ 
5While a fiduciary relationship may arise because of superiority of one party over the 
other, Utah law also holds that co-equals such as partners and joint-venturers have fiduciary 
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In thi^ ease \MC was an agent and fiducial} ot S \1 The e\ idence abundantly 
shows S \i manifested its consent that W1C should act on itsbelialt toptocuteand maintain 
health insurance tor the co-emplo\ees It also shows that AMC consented lo so act" 
RESTAtt \u Nr(StCOND)OF AGL\C \ £ 1(1) Consistent w ith an agency relationship, AMC 
reported to SAf about the health insurance it procured tor the co-employees (see Fvhibits 6, 
11, 27, and 28), and even concerning the cancellation of health insurance coveiage (See 
Exhibits 12, 14, 43, 44, and 45 ) Dan Roberts testified that the letters contained in 
Exhibits 43, 44, and 45 were all sent to SAI, who then forvvaided them on to the 
co-employees (R 735 at 82 10-24 ) 
AMC thus acted "primarily for the benefit" of SAf to help SAI piocure and 
maintain health insurance for the co-employees Banbetry, 786 P 2d at 1333, Vina, 761 P 2d 
at 585 AMC had influence or supeiiority over SAI because it controlled the process of 
placing health insurance, and AMC and its broker assured SAI that coverage w ould be placed 
or reinstated Because of those assurances, SAI relied upon AMC and maintained its PEO 
arrangement with AMC (R. 735 at 95 17 to 98 1 ) SAI was persuaded to kCrelax the care and 
vigilance [it] would ordinarily exercise " Hal Taylor Assoc , 657 P 2d at 749 Finally, it is 
cleai that SAI, as the representative of the co-employees, placed property and interests ~in 
duties. See Burke v Farrell, 656 P 2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) (holding that partners owe 
each other fiduciary duties); Brown v Richards, 840 P 2d 143, 153 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
(noting that joint venturers owe each other fiduciary duties) 
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the charge ot \MC , Banhetn, "86 P 2d at 1 V>3 with the expectation that \MC would 
protect those mteiests b\ maintaining health insuiance coverage 
I he imposition ot fiduuar\ duties in this circumstance is in harmony with the 
policies behind imposing fiduciary duties under Utah law This Court should affirm the 
District Court's findings and conclusions that AMC owed and breached fiduciary duties to 
SAI 
C. Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses 4re Property Awarded for a 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 
Utah law supports the award of both attorney tees and litigation expenses in 
this case See C ampbell \ State Fat m Mitt Auto Ins Co , 2001 UT 89, ^ 122,65 P 3d 1134, 
tev'don other grounds Campbell \ State / arm Mut Auto Ins Co , 538 U S 408 (2003) 
In Campbell, the Utah Supreme Court held that the "breach of a fiduciary obligation is a 
well-established exception to the American rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases 
generally We thus conclude that the trial court correctly held attorney fees to be a proper 
element of damages in this case " Campbell, 2001 UT 89, Tf 122 The Court also held that 
litigation expenses are recoverable *'[f]or the same reasons detailed in the previous section 
regarding attorney fees " Id at ^ }127 
The Distnct Court in this case concluded the reasoning in Campbell applied 
with equal force and awarded attorney fees and litigation expenses The PEO arrangement 
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between SAI and AMC gave use to fiduciarv duties, and AMC bleached those duties ' 1 he 
District Court found it was reasonably foreseeable to AMC that, as a result of its conduct, 
SAI would necessanh mciu attornev fees and litigation expenses. For example, AMC v\ tote 
a letter to its "Valued bmployees" dated Apul 2 C 19C>8 concerning AMC's status as a "co-
employer" and the possible legal consequences as a result of the cancellation of coxerage. 
(See Exhibit "44."). Thus, AMC had know ledge that legal consequences were likely, and it 
was reasonably foreseeable that SAI ma> pursue legal claims against AMC as a result of its 
failure to maintain health insurance coverage. As explained below, it was also foreseeable 
that SAI would bring its legal claims under a contingent fee agreement. The award of 
attorney fees and litigation expenses was appropriate and should be affirmed. 
AiMCs argument against the attorney fee award is misdirected, and it 
completely ignores the litigation expenses award. AMC first contends attorney fees should 
not have been awarded because there is no contractual provision or statute granting attorney 
fees, and thus the District Court's award was in error. (Aplt. Br. at 20.)7 However, this 
argument misses the mark entirely, because the basis for the fee award here is the "vvell-
6In Utah law claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are both considered 
"negligence-based claims." See Franco r. The Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 
et aL, 2001 UT 25, Yh 20-23, 21 P.3d 198 (negligence and breach of fiduciary claims both 
alleged clergy malpractice); Kilpatrick, etai v. Wileyt Rein & Fielding, etaL, 909 P.2d 1283, 
1289-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (the two claims are "difficult to differentiate" in legal 
malpractice action). 
7After making this argument, AMC then goes on to quote authority that expressly 
states attorney fees are recoverable in an action for breach of fiduciary duty. (Aplt. Br. 
at 25.) 
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established exception" for breach of fiduciaiv dut\ as set totth in ( ampbell *The general 
nile in Utah, and the traditional American rule, subject to cettain exceptions, is that 
attorneys fees cannot be recovered bv a prevailing part) unless permitted by statute ot 
contract " Stew ait v Utah Pub Sen Lomm , 88S P 2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) (emphasis 
added) {quoted in Campbell, 2001 U 1 89, ^[122) One such "exception" is that established 
in Campbell foi breach of fiduciary duty See Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ^122 
Appellant tues to deflect the application of Campbell by arguing it v\as a bad 
faith case, while this is not The Campbell decision does not limit its holding to bad faith 
insurance cases but giv es it general application in the case of breach of fiduciary duty See 
Campbell, 2001 UT89,^[122 8 Even if Campbell intended the exception to apply only in the 
insurance context, however, the facts of this case are similar and justify a modest extension 
of the Campbell holding The breach of fiduciary duty in Campbell was the defendant's 
failure to properly deliver the benefits of insurance coverage, namely an adequate defense 
of a lawsuit In this case, AMC's breach of duty was the failure to maintain the existence of 
insurance coverage and the resulting absence of insurance benefits The circumstances here 
are substantially similar, and the rule in Campbell properly applies. 
8The Campbell opinion cites two grounds for affirming the award of attorney fees in 
that case. The first is a consequential damages analysis which was an extension of Beck v 
Farmers Insurance Exchange,70l P 2d 795,801 (1983) Campbell,200l UT 89,f 120 I h e 
second is the fiduciary duty analysis, which the Court borrowed from Bernhard v Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 915 P 2d 1285, 1289 (Colo 1996) Campbell, 2001 UT 89,^122. The 
District Court's award in this case was based on the second ground, because of AMC's 
breach of fiduciary duty 
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Appellant also challenges the aw aid of a contingent fee amount, tathei than di\ 
hourly amount, aigumg that this appioaeh "eviscerates the entire body of legal analysis" 
concerning the awarding ot teeb ( \plt Bi at 21 ) Utah law plaml> approves the aw aid ot 
attorney fees on a contingent fee basis I or example, Campbell held that the contingency fee 
agreement ol 40% was the propei measure of attorney fees to be awarded because the 
^contingency fee agreement was foreseeable"1 to defendant. Campbell at ^ 124-125, see 
also Billings at 468 (holding attorney fees of 1/3 was reasonable and foreseeable to 
defendant). 
1 he evidence below demonstrated it was foreseeable to AMC that its acts and 
omissions likely would lead to legal action by SAI, and that SAI would likely enter into a 
contingent fee arrangement to pursue the action Plaintiff did enter into a one-third 
contingency fee agreement with its counsel (Ex 60 ) Plaintiffs expert, Alan W. Mortensen, 
Esq., testified that a 1/3 contingency fee arrangement is common in Utah and is a reasonable 
arrangement in this case (R 735 at 238 8-24 ) Specifically, evidence of the settlement of 
the Ken Auton case against AMC demonstrates foreseeabhhty. Mr. Mortensen testified that 
AMC paid the full amount Mr Auton demanded, which included his actual damages, an 
additional amount to repair his credit ieport, attorney fees equal to 1 /3 of actual damages, and 
litigation expenses (R. 735 at 235.6 to 238.24.) There was no evidence at tnal to rebut or 
otherwise challenge the testimony of Mr Mortensen. 
Finally, the most important evidence of all is that AMC stipulated at tnal that 
a contingency fee arrangement is proper in this case. Just after Mr. Mortensen so testified, 
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the Court uiquued of AMC's counsel: "You stipulate that this is also a proper case in w hich 
the contingency fee is applicable?" AMC's counsel then responded: "Yes. One-third is 
claimed. I've no argument \\ ith Counsel ha\ mg negotiated a one-third fee. If he negotiated 
a 25 per cent fee or 40 per cent fee, I'd ha\ e no problem \\ ith that. That's between him and 
the client." (R. 735 at 238:18-23.) 
Based on the foregoing facts and law, the District Court's award of attorney 
fees to SAl in the amount of 1/3 of the actual damages, and its award of litigation expenses, 
were entirely proper under Utah law, and should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ORDERED REDLAND TO PLACE 
THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS IN ESCROW 
AMC contends the District Court erred by ordering Redland to place its policy 
proceeds into an escrow account. (Aplt. Br. at 34.) This argument fails because AMC lacks 
standing, and because it was proper for the District Court to order the insurance proceeds 
placed into escrow, in custodia legis. 
A. AMC Lacks Standing. 
AMC lacks standing to make this argument on behalf of Redland. To establish 
standing in Utah a party must demonstrate the following: (1) a personal stake in the 
controversy and some causal relationship between the injury and the relief requested; (2) that 
no other party has a greater interest in the outcome and that the issues are unlikely to be 
raised at all unless the present party has standing to raise them; or (3) that the issues are of 
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such gieat public impotlance that thev ought to be decided in turtheiance ot the public 
intciest See. eg , Teuacot \ t tali Boaid of State Lands ct fevestn, 716 P 2d 796, 799 
(Utah 1986) {citing Jenkins I Suan, 675 P 2d 1 145, 1 149-50 (Utah 1983)) 
Fust, AMC lacks an actual, peisonal stake in the controveisy 4he Garnishee 
Ordei was entered against Redland, not AMC While in some cases a judgment debtor ma> 
have standing to object to a Garnishee Older, AMC does not here, and its argument is 
contrary to its own inteiests AMC should be arguing in favor of the Garnishee Order. It 
actually benefits from the Order because the pioceeds of the Redland Policy might be used 
to satisfy the judgment against it Instead, AMC argues against the Order and its argument 
is advocacy on behalf of Redland, even though Redland is represented by sepaiate counsel. 
These circumstances demonstiate that AMC lacks the actual, personal stake in the issue 
necessary for standing.9 As a result, the Court should disregard AMC's contention. 
Second, AMC lacks standing because Redland has a greater interest in the 
outcome of this issue. The issue is whether AMC's insurer, Redland, must pay insurance 
proceeds into an account in the care of the Court. The insurance proceeds are in the 
possession of Redland, not AMC. Furthermore, Redland has raised this issue on its own in 
9If a party has no mteiest in property oi assets being garnished, it has no grounds to 
oppose the garnishment. See, eg, Turner v Farnam, 120 S.W.3d 616, 619-20 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2003) (holding that party had no standing to challenge a writ of garnishment where the 
party asserted no ownership of the money and no identifiable interest in the garnished funds); 
but see, e.g, Watkins v. Hadamek, 892 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
judgment debtor employee had standing to challenge wnt of garnishment issued to employer 
because the judgment debtor had an identifiable interest in the money). 
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a related appeal, Court ot \ppeais case number 200*S(KP>2 Because Redland has standing 
and has raised the issue, the Couit should conclude that AM( lacks standing Sec renacot^ 
710 P 2d at 800 (holding that a pait\ lacked standing because other potential plaintiffs 
existed with a more direct interest m the issues) 
Because Redland has a more direct intcie^t in the insurance proceeds at issue, 
it is unnecessary to discuss the third factor of the standing test Id (declining to address thud 
part ot test because other parties w ith a more direct interest had standing). 
Even if AMC has standing to argue this issue, however, it was proper for the 
District Court to order the proceeds subject to garnishment to be placed into escrow. 
Garnished assets are properly in the care of the court The Utah Supreme Court has adopted 
the following statement of the law regarding garnished assets fc4After a levy of garnishment, 
the debt or property leached is oidinanly regarded as in custodia legis, and the garnishee is 
a mere stakeholder " Henderson & Johnson v Hooper Sugar Co , 236 P. 239, 241 (Utah 
1925). Once a writ of garnishment is issued, therefore, the assets are in the custody of the 
court and are no longer the property of either the garnishor or the garnishee In this case, the 
Garnishee Order requires the property to be placed in custodia legis in an account subject to 
the direction of the District Court 
Moreover, no cognizable harm results from requiring Redland to place policy 
proceeds into the care of the court The rules governing garnishment are liberally construed 
to allow both sides to present their claims on the merits. See Remington Rand, Inc. v O 'Neil, 
6 Utah 2d 182, 185, 309 P.2d 368, 370 (1957). The Garnishee Order does not limit 
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Redland's ability to adjudicate the claim that there is no coverage for the judgment against 
AMC- To the contiary, the Order ensures that the insurance proceeds will be available to 
either part), Redland or SA1, once the merits of the coverage dispute are decided. Cf. 
Whitney v. Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, \5, 95 P.3d 270 (pursuant to the parties1 stipulation, the 
district court ordered a garnishee to deposit a disputed amount into a bank account pending 
resolution of a related dispute and further order of the court). 
AMC's brief also reflects a misunderstanding of the Garnishee Order. AMC 
complains that the District Court ordered the disposition of Redland's property by ordering 
Redland to place the proceeds "into an escrow account which shall be released to [SAI]." 
(Apit. Br. at 34.) AMC claims SA1 will "have the unfettered right to seize all $1,000,000 of 
the funds . . . . " {Id.) It also complains that AMC or Redland "will be forced to garnish and 
seize assets of [SAI] to receive back the money which the trial court now holds out for the 
party with the quickest fruit picking arm." (Id.) 
Contrary to AMC's arguments, the District Court did not "dispose" of the 
proceeds by ordering them to be paid over to SAL Instead, the Court ordered the proceeds 
deposited in an interest-bearing account in custodia legis, pending the outcome of the Federal 
Court Action. The Garnishee Order states "[t]he account shall be established with two (2) 
required signatories, one being a representative of SAI and the other being a representative 
of Redland, both of which signatures shall be required to disburse funds from the account." 
(See Addendum.) The Garnishee Order clearly does not give SAI "unfettered" access to the 
proceeds. Instead, it ensures that the proceeds are available once the coverage dispute is 
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resolved bv placing the assets in the care of the court. See Henderson &_ Johnson, 236 P. at 
241 ("After a lex y of garnishment, the debt ot pro pert} reached is ordinariK regarded as in 
custodia legis, and the garnishee is a mere stakeholder.") 
POINT V 
SAI IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES 
INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
S Ad also requests an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred 
on this appeal. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees . . . on appeal [to] state the request explicitly and set forth 
the legal basis for such an award." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). When attorney fees are 
awarded below, and the party who prevailed below prevails on appeal, that party is also 
entitled to an award of attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal. See Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998); Utah Dep 7. of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 
1193, 1196-98 (UtahCt. App. 1991); Management Sews. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 
P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). 
S AI was awarded attorney fees by the District Court and the amount was based 
upon its one-third (1/3) contingency fee agreement with its counsel. As the record reflects, 
the agreement provides that the percentage increases to forty percent (40%) after the fding 
of an appeal. (See Ex. 60.) The facts and law set forth above supports the conclusion that 
a forty percent (40%) contingency fee award is reasonable and appropriate if SAI prevails 
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on this appeal. In fact, AMC stipulated that a "40 per cent fee" \\ ould be proper in this case. 
(R. 735 at 238:18-23.) 
Additionally, SAl has and will continue to incur litigation expenses in the 
course of this appeal. For the same reasons supporting the District Court's award, this Court 
should also award SAI the additional litigation expenses it incurs if it prevails on this appeal. 
For those reasons, SAI is entitled to its attorney fees and litigation expenses 
incurred on appeal. If SAI prevails on this appeal, the Court should remand this issue to the 
District Court to determine and award the amount of attorney fees and litigation expenses 
SAI incurred on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reject the arguments AMC 
makes on this appeal and affirm the District Court's judgment in its entirety. The Court also 
should remand the issue of attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred on appeal for 
further determination by the District Court. 
DATED this / * / day of March, 2005. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON ^ 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK 
BRIAN C. WEBBER 
MICHAEL K. WOOLLEY 
Attorneys for Staffing America, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
instrument were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, and as otherwise indicated below, on 
this J^f day of March, 2005, to the following: 
Donald Joseph Purser, Esq. 
LAW OFFICES OF DONALD JOSEPH PURSER 
2595 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Advanced Management Concepts, Inc, 
G EDSl.DOCS 15141 0001 F60052 WPD 
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ADDENDUM 
MATTHEW C B \RNECK [5249] 
BRIAN C WEBBER [8018] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT. MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Staffing America, Inc. 
Key Bank Tow er. Sev enth Floor 
50 South Mam Street 
P.O. Bo\ 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.-(801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CONCEPTS, INC., a Nevada corporation; 
RAYNETTE L. CORRIGAN, a California 
resident; 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 980912587 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial as previously scheduled on 
March 17 and 19, 2004. Plaintiff Staffing America, Inc. was present tlirough its general manager 
Dan Roberts and represented by its counsel of record Matthew C. Barneck and Brian C. Webber of 
FiL£l? CSSTR3CT COURT 
Thiro Judicial District 
MAY ; i ?eo4 
B y . 
Richards, Brandt, Millei iL Nelson Defendants Advanced Management Concepts, hie and 
Raynette L. Corrigan weie represented by their counsel of record Donald J Purser, Esq 
The Court heard testimony from several witnesses, received numerous documentary 
exhibits, and heard arguments of counsel The Court then ruled from the bench in favor of the 
Plaintiff awarding damages and pre-judgment interest as set forth below\ Based on the foregoing, 
and the Court's official record in this action, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Judgment on May 19,2004. To correct an omission concerning pre-j udgment interest that 
accrued after tnal and until the date of Judgment, the Court on its own initiative pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 60(a) nov\ enters these Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law nunc pro tunc 
to May 19, 2004. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. Parties. 
L Plaintiff Staffing America, Inc. (*'SAI") is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. ("AMC") is a Nevada 
corporation with its principal place of business in the State of California. 
3. Defendant Corrigan is a resident of the State of California who was President 
of AMC. 
2 
If- Business of SAI. 
4. Since 1995, SAI has been licensed as a professional employer organization 
O'PECT) under Utah Code Ann. § 58-59-102. 
5. As such, SAI has been engaged in the business of acquiring or providing 
employment benefits for its small business clients. SAI employs a majority of a client's workforce, 
and the employer responsibilities for the employees are allocated or shared by SAI and the client. 
6. SAI undertakes the responsibility to provide or secure certain employment 
benefits while its clients retain the responsibility to direct the day-to-day work of the employees. 
Specifically, SAI agrees with clients to provide their employees with benefits such as health 
insurance, life insurance, workers compensation benefits, payroll sendees, etc. 
III. PEG Arrangement With AMC. 
7. In 1996, SAI and AMC entered into a business relationship (the 'PEO 
Arrangement") whereby SAI and AMC became co-employers of the employees of S AI's clients (the 
"Employees'). 
8. AMC also was acting as a PEO by pooling the employees of its affiliates and 
clients to provide employment benefits, including health insurance. 
9. Before the PEO Arrangement began, AMC provided a brochure to SAI which 
represented its services as follows: 
[Y]ou can think of AMC as a "Business Partner" who assists 
you by assuming the employee liability that affects the 
- » 
coiporate "bottom line" on a daily basis. As the Client, you 
contract with AMC to transfer all or part of your existing 
payroll and personnel to AMC. AMC then becomes the 
"Legal Employer," assuming total employee liability and 
responsibility for all human resource/employee management 
functions. 
(Emphasis added.) 
10. With that understanding, SAI and AMC entered into the PEO Arrangement, 
whereby AMC would acquire health insurance coverage for the Employees and others. By virtue 
of the PEO Arrangement, AMC became the co-employer of the Employees for purposes of health 
insurance coverage. AMC treated the Employees as its own employees for purposes of their 
participation in these health insurance programs. 
11. AMC contracted for health insurance which covered each of the Employees. 
On a monthly basis SAI communicated to AMC the names of each Employee to be covered and paid 
to AMC the required premium. AMC was supposed to communicate those names to the health 
insurance company and to make sure each Employee was covered. 
12. AMC understood that SAI was acting on behalf of the Employees and that 
both SAI and the Employees were relying on AMC to maintain health insurance coverage. 
13. Health insurance is a common employment benefit in the State of Utah and 
elsewhere. When an employer provides health insurance benefits, it is common and reasonable for 
employees to rely upon the employer to maintain that coverage. Employees rely upon their health 
insurance as a means of providing necessary medical treatment for their families. 
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14 When gioup health insurance is disiupted without notice the covered 
emplovee mav suffer financial harm A cancellation of coverage also ma\ result in the employee 
being unable to secuie replacement health insurance coverage 
15 \ s President of AMC, Comgan managed its affairs and was responsible for 
ensuring that AMC fulfilled its duties to S AI and the Employees Corngan was one ot the primary 
persons who communicated with SAI as the representative of the Employees 
16 Dunng the time the PEO arrangement between SAI and AMC was in place, 
AMC acquned as least two (2) different health insurance programs Each one was an employee 
benefit program of AMC which it administered for the benefit of the Employees and others Each 
of the Employees was covered under the health insurance programs as employees of AMC 
17 AMC looked to SAI, however, as the legal representative of the Employees 
and communicated w ith SAI as such For example, each month at AMC's request SAI provided the 
names of each Employee who was to be covered under the health insuiance program, and paid to 
AMC an amount sufficient for the premiums required for those Employees 
18 When coverage was obtained through the PM Group, a Pacific Mutual 
company (the "PM Group"), a booklet entitled "Your Group Benefits Program" w as issued for each 
of the Employees AMC sent those booklets to SAI, and SAI sent them to each of the Employees 
19 AMC sent other communications to SAI on behalf of the Employees 
D 
20. AMC and Corrigan regularly received the monies from SAI, but for many 
months failed to pay the required premium to the health insurance carrier(s) to maintain the benefit 
programs for the Employees. As a result, the health insurance benefit programs were cancelled, 
leaving the Employees without coverage. 
21. AMC and Corrigan failed to notify SAI or the Employees that it was unable 
to make the required premium payments or that coverage may be cancelled. SAI learned the health 
insurance coverage was cancelled when some of the Employees submitted medical claims that were 
rejected. 
22. Those Employees then contacted SAI about the cancellation of coverage, and 
SAI communicated with AMC. 
23. As a result of the cancellation of health insurance coverage, as explained 
below, some of the Employees withheld payments for premiums they otherwise were required to pay 
to SAL made claims against SAI for the refund of payments for premiums, and even brought formal 
legal action against SAJ. Consequently, SAI was required to pay to or forego collection of monies 
from some of the Employees, and now brings this action against AMC, in part, to recover those 
monies. 
24. SAI also bangs this action to recover monies on behalf of the Employees for 
premium monies paid to AMC, and SAI intends to return those monies to the Employees. 
6 
f \ . Jetferson Pilot Co\erage 
25 .AMC contracted for health insurance coverage in 1996 w ith Jeffetson Pilot 
Life hisurance Company ("Jefferson Pilot") Beginning m Ma\ 1996, SAI supplied the names of 
each Employee who was to be coveted through [efferson Pilot and paid the amount AMC requested 
as premiums for those Emplo>ees 
26 AMC did not secure co\ erage with Jefferson Pilot until August 1996 AMC 
then made one premium payment to (efferson Pilot for the month of August 1996 on behalf the 
Employees and others in the AMC group, but failed to make any other premium payments 
27 AMC and Corngan failed to inform SAI that premium payments were not 
being made to Jefferson Pilot 
28 SAI learned the Jefferson Pilot coverage was cancelled when one of the 
Employees submitted a medical claim that was rejected for lack of coverage 
29 In response, AMC stated the cancellation was the result of an error by AMC's 
onginal agent of record, Foy & Associates, and that AMC had consulted legal counsel about the 
matter 
30 AMC offered to honor the Employees' claims for benefits and issued an 
''authorization card" which it said the Employees could utilize with their health care providers 
AMC also said it would reimburse claims the Employees had paid out of pocket 
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31. Thereafter, AMC attempted to secure other health insurance coverage for the 
Employees and other members of the group. AMC applied for such coverage with American 
National Insurance Company and other insurance companies. For these applications, AMC used Mr. 
Eugene John "Jack" Phelps of E.J. Phelps & Company in San Diego, California as its agent of 
record. 
V. Coverage Through The PM Group. 
32. hi June 1997, AMC applied for coverage with the PM Group. As AMC's 
insurance agent, Jack Phelps supplied to the PM Group a list of all employees to be covered under 
a new group health insurance policy. The list included the Employees. 
33. The PM Group issued a group health insurance policy covering the Employees 
effective July 1, 1997. A Certificate of Group Insurance titled "Your Group Benefits Program" was 
issued with AMC as the policyholder. The Certificate provides that a "covered employer'1 is "the 
Policyholder [AMC] or any of its affiliates that are reported in wnting by the Policyholder to PM 
Group." The pamphlet Your Group Benefits Program was provided to SAI, and in turn to each of 
the Employees. 
34. Each month SAI continued to pay the amount AMC requested for the 
premiums for each of the Employees under the PM Group policy. SAI paid the required amount for 
each month from July 1997 through February 1998. 
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35 Ln approximateh fanuary 1998 S 4J learned that the PM Group co\ erage w a^  
not current Employee Sheila Roberts recened a ^ Certificate of Creditable Coveiage'' fiom the PM 
Gtoupdaied fanuarv 7, 1998, which indicatedcoveiage had ended Octobei 31, 1997 SAI contacted 
AMC and learned that AMC was negotiating with the PM Gioup to maintain health insurance 
co\ erage tor the Employees 
36 Shortl} thereafter, SAI learned that the PM Group coverage in fact was 
cancelled effecti\ e Nov ember 30 1997 In letters sent in Apnl 1998, Corngan as President of AMC 
explained to the Employees her sincere belief that Pacific Mutual [the PM Group] was and still is 
legally liable for all claims through January 31, 1998 " 
37 The evidence at trial, however, showed that not long aftei the PM Group 
cov erage began, AMC became delinquent in its payment of premiums The PM Group sent a letter 
dated October 10, 1997 indicating the premium for the month of September remained unpaid 
Thereafter, the September premium w as paid The PM Group also sent a letter dated Nov ember 12, 
1997 indicating the premium for October remained unpaid, and afterward that premium also was 
paid 
38 When these delinquency notices were sent Jack Phelps told Comgan that if 
coverage were terminated the Employees would go to the doctor and have their claims denied 
39 Finally, the PM Group sent letters dated December 12 and 16, 1997 stating 
coverage was terminated effective October 31, 1997 
9 
40 In response AMC besan negotiations w ith the PM Gioup m Decembei 199" 
to maintain health insurance coverage and to explain the reasons for its delinquent payments The 
e\ idence show ed that on No\ ember 28 1997 the United States Internal Rev enue Sen ice (the "IRS") 
served a Notice of Levy which froze AMCs account at Glendale Federal Bank in California 
Thiough negotiations AMC satisfied the IRS and obtained a Release of Le\ v on December 29, 1997 
41 At the same time AMC through its agent Jack Phelps negotiated v\ ith the PM 
Group to maintain coverage Through Mr Phelps1 influence as a long-standing agent, the PM Group 
agreed to reinstate coverage upon payment of $88,629 12, which would bnng coverage current 
through December 31, 1997 A payment of 544,352 06 was to be made on or about January 8, 1998, 
and another payment of $44,277 06 v\ as to be paid b> January 25, 1998 Both payments were to be 
made by cashier's check Also, the premium for January 1998 would have to be paid by January 3 L 
1998 On those terms, health insurance coverage for the Employees was reinstated under the PM 
Group policy 
42 The evidence demonstrates that AMC paid $44,352 06 to the PM Group by 
cashier's check issued by Glendale Federal Bank on January 9, 1998 AMC failed to make the 
remaining payment due January 25, 1998, and the PM Group notified AMC that coverage was 
terminated effective November 30, 1997 
43 The evidence shows AMC believes the agreed payment plan would reinstate 
coveiage through the date of payment However, the PM Gioup reinstated coverage only as far as 
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the premiums received would pa\. The S44,352.06 onK paid for October 1997 and half of 
November 199 7. 
44. AMC failed to notify SAI or the Employees that their health insurance 
coverage through the PM Group was in doubt, that AMC was delinquent in premium payments, that 
notices of cancellation had been sent, that the IRS Levy had frozen AMC's account, that the PM 
Group agreed to reinstate coverage upon certain payment terms, or that AMC failed to comply with 
all of those terms and coverage was terminated. 
45. Following the cancellation, the evidence shows AMC tried to obtain 
replacement health insurance coverage for the Employees, through EJ. Phelps & Company. 
46. However, SAI determined it could no longer rely upon AMC to maintain 
health insurance for the Employees. SAI then obtained health insurance for the Employees through 
New York Life effective March 1, 1998. 
VI. Losses Sustained. 
47. As a result of the cancellation of health insurance coverage through Jefferson 
Pilot and the PM Group, SAI sustained losses in several categories. Each category was addressed 
in the testimony of Paul N. Shields, CPA and itemized in spreadsheets he prepared. 
48. SAI was required to pay funds and absorb losses in response to claims the 
Employees made against SAI. As itemized in Plaintiffs Exhibit "55" and explained in the testimony 
of Mr. Shields, SAI lost a total of $143,233 in medical claims and other costs incurred to or on 
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b^hilf ot the EmpIo\ees that should ha\c been cohered b\ the WIC health msutance benentb 
program 
49 S AI also paid S79 612 in payments to AMC for health insurance premiums 
for the Employees, which AMC accepted but failed to use to secuie health insurance coverage for 
the Employees 
50 Moieover, SAI lost se\ eral clients as a lesult of AMC's failure to secure and 
maintain health insurance for the Employees S AFs evidence showed it lost seveial clients as a 
result of the cancellation of health insurance coveiage through the PM Gioup The e\ idence also 
showed the amount of profit SAI was earning from its business w ith those clients The Court finds 
that the fact, the causation, and the amount of those lost profits were shown with leasonable 
certainty The e\ idence of lost clients, the reasons they were lost, and the amount of lost profits is 
supported by the testimony of Dan Roberts, Sheila Roberts and Paul N Shields, CPA, among others 
51 Based upon that evidence, the Court finds SAI sustained lost profits m the 
amount of 5228,999 
52 Thus, the total principal amount of damages is S451,844 
VI. Comparative Fault; Mitigation of Damages 
53 SAI tried to find leplacement coverage elsewhere during the term of the PEO 
Arrangement between SAI and AMC However, SAI was unable to do so because at the time PEOs 
were a relatively new kind of business entity and some health insurers were not willing to take the 
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hmmoyees Also, the Employees were a difficult gioup to place because thev \\e»e located in 
multiple states and health insuiance coverage theiefoie required compliance with the lav\s of 
multiple states 
54 Also, SAI knew that health insurance co\erage sometimes was placed or 
reinstated retroactively, so it reasonably believed that health insurance coverage for the Employees 
could be placed or reinstated as Comgan represented 
55 Finally, Corrigan continuall> represented that everything would be fine and 
that coverage would be reinstated or new coverage obtained The Court finds that Ms Corrigan was 
very persuasive and that SAI reasonably relied upon her assurances 
CONCLUSIONS OF L4W 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following 
Conclusions of Law 
I. Jurisdiction and Venue 
1. This Court has jurisdiction o\er the parties and the subject matter of this 
action under Utah Code Ann §§ 78-3-4 and 78-27-22 et seq 
2. Venue in this action is proper m Salt Lake County, State of Utah pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann §78-13-7 
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IL Negligence 
"> Defendant AMC undertook a dut\ to acquire and maintain a health insurance 
benefit plan for the Fmplo\ees The Defendant acknow ledged that S AT was a legal tepresentame 
of the Employees for puqiosesofthe health insurance progiams, and assumed a duty to communicate 
vuth SAI as the Employees' legal representative 
4. AMC also became the co-emplo>er of the Employees, such that they were all 
employees of AMC for purposes of the health insurance programs 
5 The health insurance programs obtained through both Jefferson Pilot and the 
PM Group were employee benefit programs administered by AMC for the benefit of the Employees. 
6 Defendant AMC breached its duties and committed errors and omissions by 
negligently failing to maintain the health insurance benefit programs, by allowing coverage under 
the plans to be cancelled without notice or w arning to S Af oi the Employees, and by failing to timely 
obtain replacement coverage the Employees 
7 Specifically, Defendant AMC first obtained health insurance coverage for the 
Employees through Jefferson Pilot effective August 1, 1996 
8. However, due to AMC's negligence, errors, and omissions that health 
insurance program was cancelled after a short time AMC blamed the cancellation on Foy & 
Associates, its agent of record for the placement of the coverage AMC negligently failed to notify 
SAI or the Employees that the program was or would be cancelled. 
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9 Detendant AMC then negligentK failed to obtam a replacement plan for the 
Employees until Jul\ 1 1997 
10 Beginning July 1, 1997, Defendant AMC contracted foi a health insurance 
program for the Employees with the PM Group However, due to AMC's negligence, errors, and 
omissions the health insurance program through the PM Group was cancelled effective 
November 30, 1997 
1 i AMC negligently failed to notify S AI oi the Employees that the PM Gioup 
health insurance piogram w as or would be cancelled 
12 Defendant AMC's negligence, errors, and omissions have proximately caused 
damages to SAI including those described in Section IV below 
13 AMC is vicariously liable for the conduct of Corrigan, who w as its President 
14 Because there was no evidence of conduct by Corrigan that w as beyond the 
scope of her employment at AMC, the Court concludes that all claims against Corrigan should be 
dismissed with prejudice 
III. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
15 In accordance with the PEO Arrangement between them, which w as an agency 
relationship, AMC became the fiduciary of SAI and the Employees. 
16 AMC recognized SAI as the legal representative of the Employees for the 
purpose of acquiring and maintaining a health insurance program As administrator of the program 
15 
AV1C had a fiduciary dut\ to communicate with S A I about the progiam and bpcuhcallv about the 
possibilitv that il ma\ be cancelled 
17 Defendant AMC breached us fiduciarv duties to S AI and the Emplo\ees and 
committed erroib and omissions by failing to maintain a health insurance program foi the Employees, 
and by failing to communicate vv ith S AI as the legal representative of the Employees about the status 
of the piogram 
18 AMC is v icanously liable for the conduct of Corngan, v\ ho v\ as its President 
19 The Defendants breaches of fiduciary dut> errors and omissions have 
proximately caused damages to the Plaintiff as descnbed m Section IV below 
20 Under Utah law, Plaintiff also is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney s 
fee and to be reimbursed for its litigation expenses based upon Defendant's breaches of fiduciary 
duty 
I \ . Damages 
21 The Court concludes S AI suffered compensable damages in the amounts set 
forth above in Section VI - Losses Sustained on the Findings of Fact 
22 The Court concludes that all of those damages have been established with a 
reasonable degree of certainty 
23 The Court further concludes that S AI's lost profits damages have been proven 
with sufficient certainty that reasonable minds might believe from a preponderance of the evidence 
16 
that the damages were actually suffered. SAI has proved the fact of lost profits, the causation of lost 
profits, and the amount of lost profits, all with reasonable certainty. 
24. The Court also concludes that it was a reasonably foreseeable consequence 
of AMC's actions that SAI would sustain lost profits if a health insurance program was cancelled. 
V, Pre-Judgment Interest. 
25. Under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), SAI is entitled to recover pre-judgment 
interest at ten percent (10%) on the damages identified above. The Court concludes there was a 
lawful agreement between SAI and AMC that did not specify a different rate of interest, and 
therefore the rate often percent (10%) per annum applies. 
26. The Court also concludes pre-judgment interest is appropriate because SATs 
losses were fixed as of a particular point in time and the amount of its losses can be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy. 
27. The Court concludes it is obligated to award interest at the statutorily 
mandated rate even though, with the passage of time, the award has become significant in amount. 
28. The amount of pre-judgment interest to be awarded is calculated in Plaintiffs 
Exhibit "55," which is the report of Paul N. Shields, CPA. The total amount of pre-judgment interest 
as set forth in the three (3) categories of damages addressed in that report is $261,218 as of 
March 17, 2004. Pre-judgment interest thereafter accrued at the rate of $123.79 per day for a total 
of $269,016.77 through the date of judgment. 
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VI. Final Judgment 
29 The Court concludes that a final judgment should he entered in favor of S.AI 
and against A.MC and Corngan sustaining the causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary 
dut). and awarding damages and pre-judgment interest as set forth above 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this day of May, 2004 
BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE GLENN K I ^ T S E A ^ & K £ 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUD' 
A ^ - p w ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM. 
DONALD JOSEPH PURSER 
& ASSOCLATES. P C. 
DONALD J PURSER, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Advanced Management Concepts, Inc 
and Ravnette L Comgan 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a trueand coirect cop> of the foregoing instrument v\as 
mailed, fust-class postage prepaid, on this r } <} day of Ma>, 2004, to the following 
Donald J Purser, Esq 
DONALD JOSFPH PURSFR & ASSOCIATES, P C 
2595 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Attorneys for Defendants 
O EDS I DOCS 1-141 OuOl D\ 2844 WPD 
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M \TTHEYY C BARNECK [5249] 
BRIAN C WEBBER [8018] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorney for Staffing Amenca, Inc 
Key Batik Tower, Seventh Floor 
5 (J South Main Street 
PO Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone-(801) 531-2000 
Fax No (801)532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CONCEPTS, INC , a Nevada corporation; 




Civil No. 980912587 
Judge Glenn K Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial as previously scheduled on 
March 17 and 19, 2004 Plaintiff Staffing Amenca, Inc. ("SAI") was present through its general 
manager Dan Roberts and represented by its counsel of record Matthew C. Barneck and Brian C. 
Webber of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. Defendants Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. 
Amended Judgment @J 
JD16011430 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
-MAY 2 S 200^ 
5 A a _AKE wO.JMXY 
s / C'erK 
( \ M C ) and Rdvnette L Comgan ( Conigan ) weie repiesented b\ their counsel oi recoid 
Donald J Purser Esq 
The Court heard testimony from several w ltnesses receiv ed numerous documentary 
exhibits, and heard arguments of counsel Based upon the foregoing and the Court's official recoid 
in this action, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment on Mav 
19, 2004 To correct an omission concerning pre-judgment interest that accrued after trial and until 
the date of Judgment, the Court on its own initiative pursuant to Utah R Crv P 60(a) entered 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this same date, nunc pi o tunc to Ma> 19, 
2004 For the same reasons the Court now enters this Amended Judgment pursuant to Rule :>8 A of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and also enters it nunc pro tunc to May 19, 2004 
1 This Judgment specifically incorporates each of the Findings of Fact and each 
of the Conclusions of Law set forth in the Court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law entered this same date 
2 Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff SAI and against AMC for negligence 
as alleged in its First Claim for Relief of the Third Amended Complaint 
3 Judgment is also entered in favor of SAI and against AMC for breach of 
fiduciary duty as alleged in SATs Second Claim for Relief in the Third Amended Complaint 
4 The Court enters judgment dismissing all claims against Defendant Comgan 
with prejudice, and concludes that AMC is vicariously liable for all of the conduct of Comgan 
2 
5 Based upon the foregoing the Court enters Judgment awarding damages in 
favor ot SAI and against AMC in the amount ot S4S 1,844, as itemized and referenced in the 
accompanying Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions ot Law 
6 The Court also awards pre-judgment interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 
15-1-1 in the amount of S269,016 77 through the date of the original ludgment, a^  itemized in the 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
7 The total amount of $720,860 77 shall accrue post-judgment interest pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann § 15 1 4 at the rate of 3 28% pei annum, from the date the original Judgment w as 
entered on Mav 19, 2004 The amount of this Amended Fudgment also shall be augmented by 
reasonable attorne> fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff to collect the Judgment m full 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this ^5 day of May, 2004 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
DONALD JOSEPH PURSER 
& ASSOCLATES, P C 
DONALD J PURSER, ESQ 
Attorneys for Advanced Management Concepts, Inc 
and Raynette L Corngan 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTfFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class mail, postage piepaid, on this c ^ day of May, 2004, to the following 
Donald J. Purser, Esq. 
DON ALD JOSEPH PURSER & Associ \TES, P C. 
2595 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Attorneys for Defendants 
G FDSfDOCS 15141 0001 D\ 3040 \\ PD 
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MATTHEW C. BARNECIC [5249] 
BRIAN C. WEBBER [8018] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Staffing America, Inc 
ive> Bank Tower, Seventh Flooi 
50 South Main Street 
P.O Box 2465 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone. (801)531-2000 
Fax No. (801)532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CONCEPTS, INC., a Nevada corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND 
LITIGATION EXPENSES 
Civil No 980912587 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial as previously scheduled on 
March 17 and 19, 2004. Plaintiff Staffing America, Inc. ("SAI") was present through its general 
manager Dan Roberts and represented by its counsel of record Matthew C. Bameck and Brian C. 
Webber of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. Defendant Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. 
f'AMC") was represented by its counsel of record Donald J. Purser, Esq. 
— / r> 
? ^ C ^ T K s r : T COURT !
'"i.'.rn j-.'C.'rji.q 
'-•ntnct 
^- '. s 1:04 
The Court heaid tcbtimom from \v itnesscb recen ed documentarv exhibits and heaid 
arguments of counsel The Court subsequentK entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lau on 
\4a\ 19 2004 and entered Judgment that same dav ATter further briefing on Plaintiffs claim tor 
attorne\ fees and litigation expenses the Court issued a Minute Entr\ on May 19, 2004 awarding 
attome\ fees and litigation expenses as the Plaintiff requested Based thereon, the Court now enters 
the following Findings and Ordei 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 SATs Third Amended Complaint contains two (2) claims for relief 
negligence and breach of fiduciar) dut> 
2 The Court found in fa\ or of S AI on both causes of action, and in its Amended 
Judgment in this matter awarded damages including interest in the amount of $720, 860 77 
3 SATs Third Amended Complaint also pra\ed for relief, in iele\ ant part, as 
follows "For damages resulting from the Defendants' negligence and breach of fiduciarv duties, 
including the loss of past and future business profits from the loss of customers, loss of business 
value, and interest, as well as costs and attorneys fees associated with prosecuting this action, 
all in amounts to be proven at tnal " (Emphasis added ) 
4 The following uncontroverted evidence was received at tnal in support of an 
award of attorney fees and litigation expenses 
2 
a. Alan W Mortensen, Esq testified as an expert witness that the 
attorney fee arrangement in this matter (a 1/3 contingency fee) is common and appropriate 
in cases of this type, and that such a fee arrangement is leasonable 
b. Mr Mortensen testified that the litigation expenses SAI incuned in 
prosecuting this action to trial were reasonable in amount. Specifically, the amount of 
S25,000 or higher is reasonable for this kind of case. 
c. Mr Mortensen also testified that both the attorney fee arrangement 
and the litigation expenses incurred were foreseeable to the Defendants. 
d. Evidence wras also introduced through Mr. Mortensen that AMC 
settled a lawsuit by Ken Auton (an employee of AMC and SAI) before this action was filed, 
and that AMC paid the full amount of damages sought plus litigation expenses and attorney 
fees equal to 1/3 of the compensatory damages paid. 
e. When AMC acknowledged m January 1997 that the Jefferson Pilot 
health insurance coverage was canceled, Ms. Corrigan sent a letter to all employees stating 
that AMC had sought legal counsel in connection with the cancellation. (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit "12.") 
£ After the PM Group coverage was canceled approximately a yeai later, 
AMC sent letters to the PM Group, to the employees, and to health care providers explaining 
3 
the cancellation and acknowledging that legal claims could result from the cancellation. (Sec 
Plaintiffs Exhibits -k43/* "44," and 4*45.") 
5. No evidence was presented to rebut or refute the expert testimony and other 
evidence described above. 
6. As set forth in the accompanying Affidavit of Matthew C. Barneck, the total 
amount of litigation expenses incurred by the Plaintiff through trial, plus the costs of expert 
witnesses as invoiced immediately after trial, is 539,161.53. (Bameck Aff., [^ 13.) 
7. That amount of litigation expenses is reasonable for the Plaintiff to incur given 
the nature of this case, the complexity of the damages issues involved, and the amount of damages 
at issue and ultimately awarded. 
ORDER 
Based on the Court's Minute Entry issued May 19, 2004, and upon the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, the Court hereby awards attorney fees and litigation expenses in favor of SAI and 
against AMC, and Orders as follows: 
L The Court concludes that the breach of a fiduciary duty is a well-established 
exception to the American rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases generally, and hereby concludes 
that the exception applies to support an award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses as proper 
elements of damages in this case. 
4 
2. The Court concludes it was reasonably foreseeable to AMC that, as a result 
of its conduct, SAI would necessarily incur attorney fees and litigation expenses. 
3. The Court also concludes that a contingent fee arrangement is reasonable and 
appropriate in this case, and that it was reasonably foreseeable to the Defendant that SAI would 
assert its claims or bring legal action under a contingent fee arrangement. 
4. A fee arrangement providing for a one-third (1/3) contingent fee is reasonable 
under these circumstances. Contingent fee arrangements are common in this legal community and 
in the State of Utah, and a one-third (1/3) contingent fee is reasonable and customary in Utah. 
5. Therefore, the Court awards as a reasonable attorney fee one-third (1/3) of the 
amount of damages and interest awarded in the Amended Judgment. The amount of attorney fees 
awarded is $240,286.92. 
6. For the same reasons described above, the Court concludes the Plaintiff is 
entitled to recover its litigation expenses in this matter. The Court concludes that SAfs litigation 
expenses in the amount of $39,161.53 are reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this 
case, and awards that amount in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. 
7. The total amount of attorney fees and litigation expenses as identified above, 
or $279,448.45, shall accrue post-judgment interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 at the rate 
of 3.28% per annum. The amount awarded by this Order also shall be augmented by reasonable 
attorney fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff to collect the award in full. 
5 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED tins *&? day of May. 2004 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DONALD JOSEPH PURSER 
& ASSOCIATES. P.C. 
DONALD J. PURSER, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Advanced Management Concepts. Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, pos^ag^ prepaid, on this ___^1_ da>' of May, 2004, to the following. 
Donald J Purser, Esq. 
DON VLD JOSEPH PURSER & ASSOCIATES, P C. 
2595 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake Cit\, UT 84109 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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MATTHEW C. BARNECK [5249] 
MICHAEL K. WOOLLEV [8567] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & KELSON 
Attorneys for Staffing America, Inc. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
5(J South Main Street 
P.O Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.. (801)532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CONCEPTS, INC., a Nevada corporation, 
Defendant, 
and 
REDLAND INSURANCE CO., a 
corporation, 
Garnishee. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER RE WRIT OF 
GARNISHMENT TO REDLAND 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
Civil No. 980912587 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court on Monday, October 25, 2004 at 11:00 a.m., as 
previously scheduled. The Plaintiff Staffing America, Inc. ("SAI") was represented by its counsel 
FILES GSCT^feTCC1- ' 
("nir:! Ju Jici/i Oisln* \ 
h : Ah 
Matthew C. Barneck and Michael K. Woollev of Richards, Brandt. Miller & Nelson. Garnishee 
Redland Insurance Company CRediand") was represented by its counsel Tracy A. Wilder, Esq. of 
Berrett & Associates, LC. Defendant Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. ("AMC") was 
represented b> its counsel Donald J. Purser, Esq. 
The Court received and reviewed the Writ of Garnishment and the various other 
pleadings filed in connection with it, including Redland's Motion to Quash or Stay Writ of 
Garnishment and related memoranda. Based on the written memoranda submitted to the Court, and 
the arguments of counsel at the hearing, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Re Writ of Garnishment to Redland Insurance 
Company: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff SAI filed its Complaint against Defendant AMC in this action on 
December 10, 1998. 
2. Defendant AMC is insured by Redland which issued a commercial insurance 
policy to .AMC (the 'Redland Policy"). 
3. Redland retained Donald Joseph Purser, Esq. as legal counsel to represent 
AMC in this case. 
4. The case was tried to this Court on March 17 and 19, 2004, with AMC being 
represented by Mr. Purser. 
5. On Ma\ 28, 2004, this Court entered an Amended Judgment against AMC 
awarding SAl damages in the amount of S451,844.00 and pre-judgment interest of S269,016.77, plus 
post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney fees incurred in collecting the judgment. 
6. Also on May 28, 2004, this Court entered its Findings and Order Awarding 
Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses in the amount of $279,448.45, plus post-judgment interest 
and attorney fees incurred in collecting the award 
7. Therefore, the total amount awarded to SAI and against AMC (collectively 
the "Judgment") is 51,000,309.22. 
8. Just before trial, on March 3, 2004, Redland filed a declaratory judgment 
action in United States District Court for the District of Utah, styled as Redland Insurance Co. v. 
Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. and Staffing America, Inc., Case No. 2-04-CV-213, pending 
before the Honorable Tena Campbell (the "Federal Court Action"), contending AMC is not entitled 
to insurance coverage. 
9. On June 22, 2004, Plaintiff SAI served a Writ of Garnishment on AMC and 
included all the items required by Rule 64D(d)(iii) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. By the Wnt 
of Garnishment, SAI seeks to levy upon the full $1,000,000.00 of proceeds of the Redland Policy. 
10. Redland filed Answers to Garnishee Interrogatories on or about July 19,2004. 
11. Redland filed a Request for Hearing on or about July 22, 2004. 
3 
12 Onlul\2(J 2004 SM tiled J R.ph to \n„v\ er or Garnishee and Request for 
Tnal ot Issues Relating to \\ nt of Garnishment, and also proposed a Garnishee Older 
13 Red land filed an Objection to Garnishee Older and also a Motion to Quash 
or Sta\ Writ of Garnishment on fuK 22, 2004 The Motion to Quash or Sta\ was fullv briefed 
14 The Court held a prewoush scheduled hearing on all of those issues on 
Monday, October 25, 2004 at 11 00 a m 
CONCLUSIONS O r L \ W 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as follows 
1 The Court concludes that the VVnt of Garnishment is a proper \ ehicle to levy 
upon the Redland Pohc) as an asset of the ludgment debtor AMC, based upon the authorities 
referenced by SA1 including American States Insurance Co v \\ alkei, et al, 26 Ltah 2d 161, 486 
P2d 1042 (1971) and the language of Utah R Ci\ P 64D, including Rule 64D(a)(m) titled 
''Property Subject to Garnishment " 
2 The Court concludes that the authorities cited by Redland, including Auet bach 
Co v Key Secunt) Police, Inc et al, 680 P 2d 740 (Utah 1984) and Paul v Kukendall et al, 6 
Utah 2d 256, 311 P 2d 376 (1957), do not preclude the issuance of the Writ of Garnishment in this 
case, or require it to be quashed or stayed The Court concludes the Auerbach and Paul decisions 
are distinguishable from the facts of this case and do not support Redland's Motion to Quash or Stay 
Wnt of Garnishment 
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3. Accordingly, the Court concludes the Writ of Garnishment was properly 
issued and that the proceeds of the Redland Policy are property subject to garnishment pursuant to 
Rule64D(h)(ui). 
4. The Court also concludes, pursuant to the same provision, that the proceeds 
of the Redland Policy are not exempt. Redland did not claim an exemption either in its Answers to 
Interrogatories, its Objection to Garnishee Order, or its [Motion to Quash or Stay Writ of 
Garnishment. The Court concludes no exemption applies. 
5. Rather, Redland's filings cite the fact of the pending Federal Court Action as 
its only other ground for objecting to the Writ of Garnishment, aside from the authorities referenced 
above. 
6. The Court concludes that Redland should be ordered to pay the proceeds of 
the Redland Policy, as the property subject to garnishment, into an interest-bearing account to be 
agreed upon between S AI and Redland, where the proceeds may be held pending the outcome of the 
Federal Court Action under the terms of this Order. 
7. The Court concludes that it should decline SATs request for a trial on all 
remaining issues because the Federal Court Action is already pending. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause 
appearing, the Court now hereby ORDERS as follows: 
5 
1 Redland s Motion to Quasii o^ Slav \\ ni ot Garnishment is denied and its 
Objection to Garnishee Order is o\ei ruled 
2 Redland is ordered to pa\ the proceeds of the Redland Pohc\ in the amount 
of SI 000,000 00 into a separate interest bearing account to be jomtI\ designated b> SAI and 
Redland, pending the outcome of the Fedeial Court Action The account shall be established v\ ith 
two (2) requued signatones, one being a repres^ntatp e of S \l and the othet being a representative 
of Redland both of which signatures shall be required to disburse funds from the account 
RedlaruTs payment into that account shall be made within thirt\ (30) da\s from the entrv of this 
Ordei 
3 The account shall be one which maximizes the interest to be earned on the 
pnncipal while at the same time adequateh protecting the principal against market fluctuations or 
other losses 
4 The proceeds of the Redland Pohc> shall be held 111 that account pending 
further order of ths United States Distnct Court foi the Distnct of Utah in the Federal Court Action 
If the Federal Court rules in favor of S AI, the balance of the account including interest shall be paid 
over to SAI 01 its attorneys as it may designate If the Federal Court rules in favor of Redland, the 
balance of the account including accrued interest shall be paid to Redland 
5 The Court denies S AI's request for a trial on all remaining issues and defers 
to the Federal Court Action to determine those issues 
6. The amount of payment required above shall accrue interest pursuant to Utah 
Code Am.. § 15-1-4 at the judgment rate of 3.28% per annum until paid in accordance with this 
Order. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES 
Barbara K. Berrett 
Tracy A. Wilder 
Attorneys for Red land Insurance Company 
DONALD JOSEPH PURSER & ASSOCIATES, P.C 
Donald J Purser 
Attorneys for Advanced Management Concepts. Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
Hand Delivered on this S^ day of November, 2004, to the following 
Barbara K Berrett, Esq 
Tracx A Wilder, Esq 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L C 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 530 
50 South Mam Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Attorneys fot Redland Insurance Company 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instalment was 
sent b) first-clas>s mail, postage prepaid, on this S day of No\ ember, 2004, to the following. 
Donald J Purser, Esq 
D O N U D JOSFPH PURSLR& ASSOCIATFS. P C 
2595 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Attorneys fof Advanced Management Concepts, Inc 
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